UOL: Fed repete promessa de manter juros baixos.

https://economia.uol.com.br/noticias/reuters/2020/07/29/fed-repete-promessa-de-manter-juros-baixos.htm

Reuters: Dólar avança quase 2% com noticiário doméstico; Fed contém alta.

https://br.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idBRKBN23M2VO-OBRBS

Bloomberg: Fed Worries Turned to Financial Stability in April Meeting.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-20/fed-minutes-show-officials-saw-virus-as-severe-economic-threat?utm_source=webpush&utm_campaign=BreakingNews%7CStory%7CQAMVS4DWRGG201

Exame: Ata do Fed pode dar mais gás à recuperação das bolsas.

https://exame.abril.com.br/mercados/ata-do-fed-pode-dar-mais-gas-a-recuperacao-das-bolsas/

Statement from Federal Reserve Chair Jerome H. Powell.

The fundamentals of the U.S. economy remain strong. However, the coronavirus poses evolving risks to economic activity. The Federal Reserve is closely monitoring developments and their implications for the economic outlook. We will use our tools and act as appropriate to support the economy.

https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/other20200228a.htm

Fed Chairman Powell doesn't see elevated recession risks.

Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell said Tuesday he does not feel the probability of a recession "is at all elevated," and that the country is continuing to see solid economic growth.

https://www.wtok.com/content/news/Fed-Chairman-Powell-doesnt-see-elevated-recession-risks-505730281.html

Jerome H. Powell será o novo presidente do Federal Reserve.

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/02/business/economy/jerome-powell-federal-reserve-trump.html

https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/board/powell.htm

Fed raises rates for first time in 2016.

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in November indicates that the labor market has continued to strengthen and that economic activity has been expanding at a moderate pace since mid-year. Job gains have been solid in recent months and the unemployment rate has declined. Household spending has been rising moderately but business fixed investment has remained soft. Inflation has increased since earlier this year but is still below the Committee's 2 percent longer-run objective, partly reflecting earlier declines in energy prices and in prices of non-energy imports. Market-based measures of inflation compensation have moved up considerably but still are low; most survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed, on balance, in recent months.

Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee expects that, with gradual adjustments in the stance of monetary policy, economic activity will expand at a moderate pace and labor market conditions will strengthen somewhat further. Inflation is expected to rise to 2 percent over the medium term as the transitory effects of past declines in energy and import prices dissipate and the labor market strengthens further. Near-term risks to the economic outlook appear roughly balanced. The Committee continues to closely monitor inflation indicators and global economic and financial developments.

In view of realized and expected labor market conditions and inflation, the Committee decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate to 1/2 to 3/4 percent. The stance of monetary policy remains accommodative, thereby supporting some further strengthening in labor market conditions and a return to 2 percent inflation.

In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments. In light of the current shortfall of inflation from 2 percent, the Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected progress toward its inflation goal. The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant only gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run. However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data.

The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction, and it anticipates doing so until normalization of the level of the federal funds rate is well under way. This policy, by keeping the Committee's holdings of longer-term securities at sizable levels, should help maintain accommodative financial conditions.

Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Janet L. Yellen, Chair; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Lael Brainard; James Bullard; Stanley Fischer; Esther L. George; Loretta J. Mester; Jerome H. Powell; Eric Rosengren; and Daniel K. Tarullo.

https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20161214a.htm

Janet Yellen - Federal Reserve.

Today, President Obama nominated Dr. Janet Yellen to succeed Ben Bernanke as Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.  Dr. Yellen has served in leadership positions at the Fed for more than a decade, including the last three years as Vice Chair. She also served previously as the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, and was a leading researcher in monetary economics at Harvard and Berkely.

In government, Dr. Yellen has been known for her sound judgment and ability to build consensus. As an academic, she made critical contributions to understanding how monetary policy can make a difference for jobs, growth and the lives of ordinary people. 505 economists from more than 211 colleges and universities—including some of the country’s leading monetary economists—have signed a letter endorsing her for Fed Chair.

If confirmed by the Senate, Dr. Yellin would be the first woman to hold the position of Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.  

The White House Blog.

Um Banco Central com três objetivos?

Garimpei este texto do CRISTIANO ROMERO, diretamente da página do ValorInveste.  Na realidade, a insistência em mudar o que está dando certo, um dia conseguirá de fato até colocar  a casa em desordem. Se cumprir um objetivo é difícil, missão impossível para três...  

  

Se o projeto de Lindberg Farias (PT-RJ) for aprovado pelo plenário do Senado, o Banco Central (BC) passará a ter três objetivos: assegurar o poder de compra da moeda; estimular o crescimento econômico e a geração de emprego. Trata-se de uma mudança radical que, se confirmada, poderá representar o fim do regime de metas para inflação, adotado pelo Brasil há 13 anos.

Por esse regime, o BC persegue uma meta – a de inflação, fixada pelo governo via Conselho Monetário Nacional. Para cumprir seu objetivo, o Banco Central utiliza a taxa básica de juros (Selic), levando em conta as condições gerais da economia (demanda do setor público, das famílias e das empresas; oferta de bens e produtos; taxa de desemprego; expectativas de inflação e de crescimento; cenário externo etc.).

Ao justificar seu projeto, o senador petista citou o exemplo do Federal Reserve (Fed), banco central dos Estados Unidos, que perseguiria “as condições monetárias e de crédito na economia em busca do emprego máximo, preços estáveis e taxas de juros de longo-termo moderadas”. Na prática, o Fed persegue uma meta de inflação, mas, ao contrário do Brasil, não tem uma meta explícita e, por essa razão, é bastante criticado em seu país.

Lindberg assegurou que sua proposta está em linha com o que pensa a presidente Dilma Rousseff. “A presidenta tem dito que o objetivo da política econômica do seu governo é perseguir a estabilidade monetária e combater a inflação, mas conjugar isso com crescimento econômico. Nós estamos colocando isso de forma clara”, disse ele, segundo reportagem da repórter Raquel Ulhôa, no portal do Valor.

Por trás do projeto do senador está a ideia de que o BC, ao ter apenas uma meta, não se preocupa com o crescimento da economia nem com as taxas de desemprego. Esta é uma ideia equivocada. No regime de metas, embora o objetivo precípuo do BC seja trazer a inflação para o alvo definido pelo governo, a autoridade monetária procura cumprir sua missão de forma a diminuir a volatilidade do produto.

O regime contempla, por meio do intervalo de tolerância (dois pontos percentuais para cima e dois para baixo), espaço para absorção de choques de oferta. Admite, ainda, a possibilidade de ajuste nos momentos em que fica claro que a busca da meta, no curto prazo, derruba excessivamente a atividade econômica. O Brasil, por exemplo, já recorreu ao mecanismo da meta ajustada em mais de uma oportunidade.

O projeto de Lindberg Farias está no contexto geral da cacofonia que, infelizmente, tem imperado no governo Dilma quanto aos rumos da política econômica. Oficialmente, o regime em vigor – o de metas para inflação, câmbio flutuante e superávit primário – ainda não mudou, mas não faltam ideias e propostas para flexibilizá-lo, em prol de um suposto crescimento econômico mais forte, de uma taxa de câmbio menos apreciada, de juros menores e de uma maior tolerância com a inflação.

O governo tem legitimidade política para mudar o modelo econômico, mas ainda não o fez oficialmente. O resultado de todo o falatório, no qual se insere o projeto do senador Lindberg Farias, tem ajudado, na prática, a derrubar a taxa de crescimento e a aumentar a inflação, o oposto do que pretendem os defensores de mudanças.

A experiência internacional das duas últimas décadas mostra que a maneira mais eficaz de lidar com a inflação e assegurar o pleno emprego é trabalhar com um regime de metas para a inflação, cujo principal instrumento é a taxa básica de juros. O BC brasileiro faz hoje o que fazem inúmeros BCs pelo mundo.

A covardia do FED!

Paul Krugman, no seu blog, aqui publicado pelo ESTADÃO: Não surpreende, realmente, mas choca mesmo assim. O Federal Reserve (Fed, o banco central americano) prevê um desemprego desastrosamente alto até onde a vista alcança: E em resposta a essa perspectiva tétrica, ele declara seu trabalho encerrado. Notem que o Fed não compra a ideia de que há um grande aumento da taxa de desemprego estrutural, de que 9% é o novo normal. Essa coisa mais para a direita, rotulada “longer run” (longo prazo), é de fato a estimativa do Fed para quão baixo o desemprego poderia e deveria ir sem causar problemas de inflação. De modo que o Fed concorda em que alguma coisa deve ser feita para aumentar bastante a demanda. Mas ele lava as mãos do problema, apesar de Bernanke e seus colegas estarem perfeitamente cientes de que ninguém mais agirá. Eu estou ciente de que há dúvidas sobre quanto o Fed poderia realizar; eu compartilho essas dúvidas. Mas isso não é razão para não tentar. Essa exibição de passividade é assustadora. E vergonhosa.

When a Nobel Prize Isn’t Enough

Até laureados com o NOBEL tem seus momentos de tristeza e desilusão com o ser humano. Neste artigo no The New York Times de June 5, 2011, o NOBEL PETER DIAMOND se queixa de seus colegas por não ratificarem seu nome como um dos integrantes do FED. Imaginem o que acontece conosco, simples mortais...

By PETER A. DIAMOND is a professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Last October, I won the Nobel Prize in economics for my work on unemployment and the labor market. But I am unqualified to serve on the board of the Federal Reserve — at least according to the Republican senators who have blocked my nomination. How can this be?

The easy answer is to point to shortcomings in our confirmation process and to partisan polarization in Washington. The more troubling answer, though, points to a fundamental misunderstanding: a failure to recognize that analysis of unemployment is crucial to conducting monetary policy.

In April 2010, President Obama nominated me to be one of the seven governors of the Fed. He renominated me in September, and again in January, after Senate Republicans blocked a floor vote on my confirmation. When the Senate Banking Committee took up my nomination in July and again in November, three Republican senators voted for me each time. But the third time around, the Republicans on the committee voted in lockstep against my appointment, making it extremely unlikely that the opposition to a full Senate vote can be overcome. It is time for me to withdraw, as I plan to inform the White House.

The leading opponent to my appointment, Richard C. Shelby of Alabama, the ranking Republican on the committee, has questioned the relevance of my expertise. “Does Dr. Diamond have any experience in conducting monetary policy? No,” he said in March. “His academic work has been on pensions and labor market theory.”

But understanding the labor market — and the process by which workers and jobs come together and separate — is critical to devising an effective monetary policy. The financial crisis has led to continuing high unemployment. The Fed has to properly assess the nature of that unemployment to be able to lower it as much as possible while avoiding inflation. If much of the unemployment is related to the business cycle — caused by a lack of adequate demand — the Fed can act to reduce it without touching off inflation. If instead the unemployment is primarily structural — caused by mismatches between the skills that companies need and the skills that workers have — aggressive Fed action to reduce it could be misguided.

In my Nobel acceptance speech in December, I discussed in detail the patterns of hiring in the American economy, and concluded that structural unemployment and issues of mismatch were not important in the slow recovery we have been experiencing, and thus not a reason to stop an accommodative monetary policy — a policy of keeping short-term interest rates exceptionally low and buying Treasury securities to keep long-term rates down. Analysis of the labor market is in fact central to monetary policy.

Senator Shelby also questioned my qualifications, asking: “Does Dr. Diamond have any experience in crisis management? No.” In addition to setting monetary policy in light of a proper understanding of unemployment, the Fed is responsible for avoiding banking crises, not just trying to mop up afterward.

Among the issues being debated now is how much we should increase capital requirements for banks. Selecting the proper size of the increase requires a balance between reducing the risk of a future crisis and ensuring the effective functioning of financial firms in ordinary times. My experience analyzing the properties of capital markets and how economic risks are and should be shared is directly relevant for designing policies to reduce the risk of future banking crises.

Instead of going to the Fed, however, I will go about my congenial professional existence as a professor at M.I.T., where I have taught and researched since 1966, and I will take advantage of some of the many opportunities that come to a Nobel laureate. So don’t worry about me.

But we should all worry about how distorted the confirmation process has become, and how little understanding of monetary policy there is among some of those responsible for its Congressional oversight. We need to preserve the independence of the Fed from efforts to politicize monetary policy and to limit the Fed’s ability to regulate financial firms.

Concern about the (seemingly low) current risk of future inflation should not erase concern about the large costs of continuing high unemployment. Concern about the distant risk of a genuine inability to handle our national debt should not erase concern about the risk to the economy from too much short-run fiscal tightening.

To the public, the Washington debate is often about more versus less — in both spending and regulation. There is too little public awareness of the real consequences of some of these decisions. In reality, we need more spending on some programs and less spending on others, and we need more good regulations and fewer bad ones.

Analytical expertise is needed to accomplish this, to make government more effective and efficient. Skilled analytical thinking should not be drowned out by mistaken, ideologically driven views that more is always better or less is always better. I had hoped to bring some of my own expertise and experience to the Fed. Now I hope someone else can.